Irreversible Capital Accumulation and Non-Linear Tax Policy by Luis, H.R. & Koskela, Erkki
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassflas 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff  
 
Discussion Papers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Irreversible Capital Accumulation and Non-Linear 
Tax Policy 
 
 
Luis H.R. Alvarez 
Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, RUESG and 
HECER 
 
and 
 
Erkki Koskela 
University of Helsinki, RUESG and HECER 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 49 
February 2005 
 
ISSN 1795-0562 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-00014 
University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-191-28781,  
E-mail info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi 
HECER 
Discussion Paper No. 49 
 
Irreversible Capital Accumulation and Non-Linear 
Tax Policy* 
 
Abstract 
 
We analyze the impact of tax progression on optimal investment policy and its value by 
first demonstrating that optimal investment policy maximizes the value of the firm and the 
rate at which it is growing as a function of operating capital stock. Then we show that three 
possible optimal regimes arise depending on the nature of tax policy. If the exogenously 
given progression threshold lies between the optimal capital stocks in the case of higher 
and lower marginal profit taxes, then optimal policy is independent of profit tax rates. 
Outside this corner solution optimal investment policy is conventional. 
 
JEL Classification: H25, H32, E22. 
 
Keywords: Optimal investment, cost of capital, non-linear tax policy.  
 
 
Luis H.R. Alvarez   Erkki Koskela                               
 
Department of Economics,  Department of Economics 
Quantitative Methods in Management             P.O.Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7) 
Turku School of Economics and                 University of Helsinki 
Business Administration    FI-00014 University of Helsinki 
Rehtorinpellonkatu 3   FINLAND 
FI-20500 Turku                                             
FINLAND 
 
e-mail: luis.alvarez@tukkk.fi                                  e-mail: erkki.koskela@helsinki.fi 
 
 
 
* The research of Luis H.R. Alvarez has been supported by the Foundation for the 
Promotion of the Actuarial Profession and the Finnish Insurance Society. Both authors 
thank the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation and Research Unit of Economic Structures and 
Growth (RUESG) at the University of Helsinki for financial support. 
 
1 Introduction
It is reasonable to argue that most major investments are at least partially irreversible due to the
fact that firms cannot disinvest without costs after having carried out their investment decision.
Physical capital is of course industry-specific, but also often firm-specific. In the recent literature
using the framework of irreversible investment under uncertainty various justifications for the neutral
tax system have been analyzed by using real option theory. In most studies corporate taxation has
been assumed to be proportional meaning that the marginal and the average tax rate are constant
and therefore equal. But in practice if for instance there is tax exemption this is not an appropriate
assumption. Even though the marginal tax rate would be constant, the average tax rate would
increases with the tax base so that in this case taxation is progressive. Alvarez and Koskela (2004)
have studied the impact of tax progression - defined as the higher average tax rate in terms of the tax
base - on irreversible investment under uncertainty. They have shown that if tax exemption is smaller
than the sunk cost of investment, higher tax rate will decelerate optimal investment by raising the
optimal investment threshold, while if tax exemption is greater than the sunk cost of investment,
interestingly three different regimes in terms of optimal investment threshold arise. First, for a set
of ”sufficiently low” volatilities of underlying value dynamics, higher volatility decreases the optimal
investment threshold, but is independent of tax rate. Second, for ”medium” volatilities the optimal
investment threshold does not depend either on tax rate or volatility. Finally, when volatility is
”high enough”, the optimal investment threshold will depend positively on volatility but negatively
on tax rate so that in this case we have ”tax paradox”.
In the case of proportional taxation under certainty Samuelson (1964) and Johansson (1969)
showed that under the uniform marginal tax rate the present value of the returns on investment
project is not affected by the tax rate so that investment neutrality prevails if tax depreciation is
equal to economic depreciation and debt interest is deductible. Since there might be difficulties
to implement this because of true economic depreciation may not be observable, the cash flow tax
emerges as an interesting alternative neutral tax. The idea is to write-off completely new investment
expenditures in the year of acquisition but no later deduction for interest rate or depreciation (see
Smith (1963)). Sandmo (1979) has shown that this is valid only under the assumption that the
tax rate is constant over time (see also Boadway and Bruce (1984) and Sinn (1987), chapter 5).
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The purpose of our paper is to abstract from uncertainty and study the impact of taxation on
irreversible investment and capital accumulation in the situation where taxation is not proportional,
but progressive.
First, we characterize a set of weak conditions under which a unique optimal investment policy
exists and when Tobin’s q can be expressed in terms of the associated optimal timing problem, Then
we assume that the marginal profit tax rate increases at an exogenously given progression threshold.
We characterize the optimal investment policy and its value in the presence of progressive taxation
and show that three possible optimal regimes arise depending on the nature of tax policy. More
specifically, if the progression threshold lies between the optimal capital stocks in the case of higher
and lower marginal profit tax rates, then optimal investment policy is independent of tax policy.
But outside this corner solution, optimal capital accumulation policy is conventional, which has
been analyzed in the literature.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we present the optimal irreversible capital accumulation
problem under certainty without taxation. Section 3 incorporates progressive tax system, where
marginal profit tax rate increases after progression threshold and analyzes its impact on optimal
capital accumulation and its value. In section 4 we illustrate explicitly our general findings con-
cerning the effects of profit taxation both on the optimal capital accumulation policy and its value.
Finally, there is a brief concluding section.
2 Irreversible Investment and Capital Accumulation
In this section we characterize the optimal irreversible capital accumulation problem subject to the
standard capital accumulation rule in the deterministic case without taxation. More precisely, we
proceed as follows: First we present the optimal control problem and show a relatively weak set of
conditions under which a unique optimal investment policy exists. Second we characterize a set of
conditions when the marginal value of capital and, therefore, Tobin’s q can be expressed in terms of
an associated optimal timing problem which can be interpreted as an optimal exit problem familiar
from the real options literature on optimal exit.
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Consider the optimal control problem
V (k) = sup
I∈Λ
∫ ∞
0
e−rs[pi(KIs )ds− qdIs] (2.1)
subject to standard capital accumulation rule
dKIt = dIt − δKIt dt K0 = k, (2.2)
stating that net investments are equal to gross investments less depreciation. In (2.1) q denotes the
unit price of investment goods, r denotes the risk free discount rate, pi(k) denotes the revenue flow
accrued from operating with a capital stock k, and It denotes the gross investment policy of the firm.
We assume that the revenue flow pi(k) is continuous and satisfies the condition limk↓0 pi(k) = 0. We
call a gross investment policy It admissible if it is non-negative, non-decreasing, and right-continuous,
and denote the set of admissible investment policies as Λ. It is worth emphasizing that the assumed
monotonicity and non-negativity of the admissible investment policies imply that investment is
irreversible. Hence, once the firm has invested the capital stock cannot be instantaneously adjusted
to a lower capital stock by disinvestment.
Before introducing taxes into the general analysis of the considered class of irreversible invest-
ment problems, we first define the mapping θ : R+ 7→ R according to the familiar characterization
θ(k) = pi(k)− q(δ + r)k, (2.3)
where (δ + r)qk denotes the user cost of capital (see e.g. Hall and Jorgenson (1967)). At this point
it is worth noticing that θ(k) can be interpreted as the growth rate of the excess returns accrued
from following an optimal irreversible capital accumulation policy since
V (k) ≤ qk + sup
I∈Λ
∫ ∞
0
e−rsθ(KIs )ds. (2.4)
We can now establish the following auxiliary result applied later in the general analysis of the
optimal capital accumulation policy in the presence of a non-linear tax policy.
Theorem 2.1. Assume that θ(k) attains a unique global maximum at k˜ = argmax{θ(k)} > 0 and
that θ(k) is non-decreasing for k < k˜ and non-increasing for k > k˜. Then the value of the rationally
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managed firm reads as
V (k) =

qk + (Rrθ)(k) + δr (Rrθ)
′(k˜)k˜1+r/δk−r/δ, k > k˜
qk + θ(k˜)r , k ≤ k˜
(2.5)
where
(Rrθ)(k) =
k−r/δ
δ
∫ k
0
yr/δ−1θ(y)dy (2.6)
denotes the cumulative present value of the flow θ(k). Especially, the value V (k) is continuously
differentiable on R+ and satisfies the inequality V ′(k) ∈ (0, q]. Moreover, if the revenue flow pi(k)
is concave then V (k) is concave as well.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 2.1 states a set of weak conditions under which a unique optimal investment policy
exists and can be characterized in terms of a single capital stock threshold at which investing
becomes optimal. It is worth emphasizing that the results of Theorem 2.1 are very general since it
only requires that the auxiliary mapping θ(k) satisfies a set of weak monotonicity conditions and
that the cumulative present value of the revenue flow exists.
An interesting implication of Theorem 2.1 stating a set of conditions under which the marginal
value of capital and, therefore, Tobin’s q can be interpreted in terms of an associated optimal timing
problem is now stated in the following.
Theorem 2.2. Assume that the conditions of Theorem 2.1 are satisfied. Then the marginal value
of capital V ′(k) reads as
V ′(k) = q + (Rrθ)′(k)−H(k), (2.7)
where
H(k) = sup
t≥0
[
e−(r+δ)t(Rrθ)′(Kt)
]
can be expressed as
H(k) = k−r/δ−1 sup
y≤k
[
yr/δ+1(Rrθ)′(y)
]
=

(Rrθ)′(k˜)
(
k
k˜
)−r/δ−1
, k > k˜
(Rrθ)′(k), k ≤ k˜,
(2.8)
and Kt denotes the capital stock in the absence of investment, that is, K ′t = −δKt.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 2.2 demonstrates that the optimal investment policy does not only maximize the
value of the firm, it also maximizes the rate at which this value is growing as a function of the
operating capital stock (see e.g. Abel (1990) and Caballero (1999) who provide excellent surveys of
the classical q-theory of investment and its various extensions). This finding is of interest, since it
states an explicit connection between standard neoclassical investment theory and the q-theory of
investment.
3 Progressive Taxation and Optimal Investment
After having characterized the optimal irreversible capital accumulation problem and a set of con-
ditions for a unique solution and when Tobin’s q can be expressed in terms of the optimal timing
problem, we now introduce a progressive profit tax system and analyze its impact on the optimal
capital accumulation policy and its value. We proceed as follows: First, we characterize the non-
proportional profit taxation, i.e. when the tax rate if not constant in terms of tax base. Progressivity
can be characterized either (A) in terms of increasing average tax rate when the marginal tax rate is
constant, but there is a tax exemption, which means that higher tax base will increase the average
tax rate or (B) that the marginal tax rate will increases with the tax base. In Alvarez and Koskela
(2004) the impact of tax progressivity - defined by (A) - has been analyzed in the framework of opti-
mal investment problem under stochastic value process. In this paper we abstract from stochasticity
and study the implications of progressivity when the marginal tax rate increases with the tax base
(in terms of tax progressivity, see the seminal paper by Musgrave and Thin (1948) and a textbook
analysis by Lambert (2001)). Second, we characterize the optimal investment policy and its value
when the profit tax rate increases at a certain level of before tax revenue flow, i.e. definition (B).
Finally, in section 4 we illustrate our new findings numerically.
We now plan to investigate the optimal investment problem (2.1), when the after tax revenue
flow reads (cf. Kari (1999), Alvarez and Koskela (2004))
pi(k) = (1− τ1)pˆi(k)− (τ2 − τ1)(pˆi(k)− pˆi(k∗))+ (3.1)
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where pˆi(k) is the before tax revenue flow and k∗ is an exogenously determined constant progression
threshold at which the profit tax rate increases from τ1 to τ2. In accordance with standard neoclas-
sical studies of the firm, we assume that the short-run profit flow pˆi(k) is continuously differentiable,
increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies the standard Inada-conditions. Given these assumptions,
the instantaneous yield θ(k) reads as
θ(k) =

θ2(k), k > k∗
θ1(k), k ≤ k∗,
where
θ1(k) = (1− τ1)pˆi(k)− (r + δ)qk
and
θ2(k) = (1− τ2)pˆi(k)− (r + δ)qk + (τ2 − τ1)pˆi(k∗).
Denote now as ki the capital stock at which the yield θi(k) is maximized for i = 1, 2. Our assumptions
imply that
θ′i(ki) = (1− τi)pi′(ki)− (δ + r) q = 0
for i = 1, 2. Especially, since τ2 > τ1 we find that
pi′(k2) =
(r + δ)q
(1− τ2) >
(r + δ)q
(1− τ1) = pi
′(k1)
implying by the strict concavity of pi(k) that k2 < k1. Thus, we find that in the presence of
the considered progressive tax system three possible cases may arise depending on the progression
threshold k˜. Our main conclusions on the nature of the optimal investment policy and the value of
the firm are now summarized in the following.
Theorem 3.1. The value of the rationally managed firm reads as
V (k) =

qk + (Rrθ)(k) + δr (Rrθ)
′(k˜)k˜1+r/δk−r/δ, k > k˜
qk + θ(k˜)r , k ≤ k˜
(3.2)
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where the optimal investment threshold
k˜ = argmax{θ(k)} =

k2, if k∗ < k2 < k1
k∗, if k2 < k∗ < k1
k1, if k2 < k1 < k∗.
(3.3)
Proof. The result is an straightforward consequence of Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 3.1 characterizes the optimal investment policy and its value in the presence of pro-
gressive taxation. As intuitively is clear, we find that in the presence of progressive taxation three
possible regimes arise depending on the progression threshold. Interestingly, in the case where
k∗ ∈ (k2, k1) the optimal investment policy is independent of the tax policy, while outside this
region the optimal capital accumulation policy is conventional.
4 Illustration
In order to illustrate explicitly our general findings on the impact of progressive profit taxation on
the optimal capital accumulation policy and its value, we assume that the revenue flow pˆi(k) now
reads as pˆi(k) = akb, where a > 0 and b ∈ (0, 1) are exogenously given constants. It is now a simple
exercise in nonlinear programming to establish that if τ1 < τ2 then in the present example
k1 =
(
(1− τ1)ab
(r + δ)q
)1/(1−b)
>
(
(1− τ2)ab
(r + δ)q
)1/(1−b)
= k2
implying for i = 1, 2 the familiar comparative statics
∂ki
∂τi
= − ki
(1− b)(1− τi) < 0
stating that higher profit taxation should decelerate rational investment demand by decreasing the
optimal capital stock threshold at which reinvestment becomes optimal. Especially, Theorem 3.1
now implies that there are three different optimal regimes depending on the precise magnitude of
the exogenously determined threshold k∗. Moreover, the value of the optimal policy now reads as
in (3.2), where in our explicit case the cumulative present value of the flow θ(k) can be expressed as
(Rrθ)(k) =

(1− τ2) akbr+δb − (τ1 − τ2)ak
∗b
r
(
1− δbr+δb
(
k
k∗
)−r/δ)− qk k ≥ k∗
(1− τ1) akbr+δb − qk k < k∗
(4.1)
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so that
(Rrθ)′(k) =

(1− τ2)abkb−1r+δb − (τ1 − τ2)abk
∗b−1
r+δb
(
k
k∗
)−r/δ−1 − q k ≥ k∗
(1− τ1)abkb−1r+δb − q k < k∗.
(4.2)
The growth rate of the excess returns accrued from following an optimal irreversible capital ac-
cumulation policy and the optimal investment thresholds are illustrated in Figure 1 (under the
assumption that a = 1, b = 0.75, τ1 = 0.15, τ2 = 0.3, q = 0.45). As was stated in our Theorem
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Figure 1: θ(k) and the optimal capital stock thresholds in the three different regimes
3.1, there are three possible optimal regimes depending on the progression threshold k∗. As our
numerical illustration indicates, the optimal investment threshold now reads as
k˜ =

1.85, if k∗ < 1.85
k∗, if 1.85 ≤ k∗ ≤ 4.03
4.03, if k∗ > 4.03.
Thus, the optimal capital accumulation policy is independent of the profit tax rate as long as the
progression threshold satisfies the inequality 1.85 ≤ k∗ ≤ 4.03. Outside this corner solution the
optimal capital accumulation policy is a conventional one.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the following issue: what is the impact of profit tax progression –
defined as the increase of the marginal profit tax rate at an exogenously given progression threshold
– on the optimal investment policy and its value. First, we provided a set of weak conditions under
which a unique optimal investment policy exists and second, we demonstrated that the optimal
investment policy does not only maximize the value of the firm but also maximizes the rate at
which this value is growing as a function of the operating capital stock. Finally, and importantly,
we showed that three possible optimal regimes arise depending on the progression threshold. More
precisely, if the progression threshold lies between the optimal capital stocks in the case of higher
and lower marginal profit taxes, then optimal investment policy is independent of the profit tax
rate. Outside this corner solution the optimal capital accumulation policy is conventional.
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A Proof of Theorem 2.1
Proof. Consider first the cumulative present value of the flow θ(k). It is now clear that
(Rrθ)(k) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rsθ(ke−δs)ds.
Making the change of variable y = ke−δs implies that e−rs = (y/k)r/δ and, therefore, that the
cumulative present value (Rrθ)(k) can be expressed as in (2.6). Given this observation, consider the
functional
J(k) =
δ
r
kr/δ+1(Rrθ)′(k) =
1
r
kr/δθ(k)− 1
δ
∫ k
0
yr/δ−1θ(y)dy.
If 0 < k < z < k˜, then
J(z)− J(k) = 1
r
[
zr/δθ(z)− kr/δθ(k)
]
− 1
δ
∫ z
k
yr/δ−1θ(y)dy
≥ 1
r
kr/δ [θ(z)− θ(k)] ≥ 0.
Similarly, if k˜ < k < z <∞, then
J(z)− J(k) = 1
r
[
zr/δθ(z)− kr/δθ(k)
]
− 1
δ
∫ z
k
yr/δ−1θ(y)dy
≤ 1
r
kr/δ [θ(z)− θ(k)] ≤ 0.
Hence, the mapping J(k) is increasing on (0, k˜), decreasing on (k˜,∞), and attains a unique global
maximum at k˜.
Denote now the proposed value function as Vp(k). Since Vp(k) is attained by applying the
admissible singular investment strategy defined as I0 = (k˜ − k)+ and
It = δk˜, t ≥ inf{t ≥ 0 : KIt = k˜}
we observe that V (k) ≥ Vp(k). In order to prove the opposite inequality we first observe that the
proposed value function is non-negative and continuously differentiable. Since −δkV ′p(k)− rVp(k)+
pi(k) = 0 on (k˜,∞) and
−δkV ′p(k)− rVp(k) + pi(k) = θ(k)− θ(k˜) < 0
by the assumed monotonicity of θ(k) we find that −δkV ′p(k) − rVp(k) + pi(k) ≤ 0 for all k ∈ R+.
Moreover, standard differentiation implies that for all k ∈ (k˜,∞) it holds that
V ′p(k) = q +
r
δ
k−r/δ−1
(
J(k)− J(k˜)
)
≤ q,
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since k˜ = argmax{J(k)}. Consequently, V ′p(k) ≤ q for all k ∈ R+. Hence, the proposed value
function satisfies the sufficient variational inequalities and, therefore, Vp(k) ≥ V (k).
It remains to prove that V ′(k) is decreasing and, therefore, that V (k) is concave whenever the
cash flow pi(k) is concave. To accomplish this task we first observe that since the value satisfies the
condition −δkV ′(k) = rV (k)− pi(k) on (k˜,∞) we find by ordinary differentiation that −δkV ′′(k) =
(r + δ)V ′(k) − pi′(k) on the set where pi(k) is differentiable. Thus, in order to prove the alleged
concavity of the value function it is sufficient to demonstrate that (r + δ)V ′(k) ≥ pi′(k) on (k˜,∞).
For all k ∈ (k˜,∞) it holds
V ′(k)− pi
′(k)
(r + δ)
=
r
δ
k−r/δ−1(J(k)− J(k˜))− θ
′(k)
(r + δ)
.
The assumed concavity of pi(k) now implies that θ(k) is concave as well. Combining this observation
with the monotonicity of θ(k) on (k˜,∞) then yields
r
δ
k−r/δ−1(J(k)− J(k˜)) = 1
δ
k−r/δ−1
∫ k
k˜
yr/δθ′(y)dy ≥ θ
′(k)
(r + δ)
(
1−
(
k˜/k
)r/δ+1) ≥ θ′(k)
(r + δ)
,
which completes the proof of our Theorem.
B Proof of Theorem 2.2
Proof. Consider first the optimal stopping problem
H(k) = sup
t≥0
[
e−(r+δ)t(Rrθ)′(Kt)
]
.
We claim that the optimal stopping time is t∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Kt ≤ k˜} = max(0, ln(k/k˜)/δ) and,
therefore, that the value of the optimal stopping policy reads as
H∗(k) =

(Rrθ)′(k˜)
(
k
k˜
)−r/δ−1
, k > k˜
(Rrθ)′(k), k ≤ k˜.
It is clear that since the stopping time t in the stopping problem (2.8) is arbitrary, we have that
H(k) ≥ H∗(k) for all k ∈ R+. To prove the opposite inequality, we observe that since k˜ =
argmax{J(k)} = argmax{θ(k)} we have the inequality
−δ
r
kr/δ+1(Rrθ)′(k) ≥ −δ
r
k˜r/δ+1(Rrθ)′(k˜)
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implying that
(Rrθ)′(k)kr/δ+1 ≤ k˜r/δ+1(Rrθ)′(k˜)
for all k ∈ R+. Moreover, since k−r/δ−1 is the fundamental solution of the ordinary first order
differential equation −δku′(k) − (r + δ)u(k) = 0 we find that e−(r+δ)tK−r/δ−1t = k−r/δ−1 for all
(t, k) ∈ R2+. Thus, if k > k˜ then
H(k) = sup
t≥0
[
e−(r+δ)t
(Rrθ)′(Kt)
K
−r/δ−1
t
K
−r/δ−1
t
]
≤ (Rrθ)′(k˜)
(
k
k˜
)−r/δ−1
= H∗(k).
On the other hand, Kt = ke−δt ≤ k for all t ≥ 0 and
K
r/δ+1
t (Rrθ)
′(Kt) ≤ (Rrθ)′(k)kr/δ+1
for all k ∈ (0, k˜] since (Rrθ)′(k)kr/δ+1 is non-decreasing on (0, k˜]. Thus, we find that if k ≤ k˜ then
H(k) ≤ sup
t≥0
[
e−(r+δ)t(Rrθ)′(k)kr/δ+1K
−r/δ−1
t
]
= (Rrθ)′(k) = H∗(k),
proving that H(k) = H∗(k) for all k ∈ R+. Combining this result with (2.5) then proves (2.7).
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